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Abstract 
This study investigates the stability of demand for money in the proposed Southern African 
Monetary Union (SAMU). The study uses annual data for the period 1981 to 2015 from ten 
countries making-up the Southern African Development Community (SADC). A standard 
function of demand for money is designed and estimated using a bounds testing approach to 
co-integration and error-correction modeling. The findings show divergence across countries 
in the stability of money.  This divergence is articulated in terms of differences in 
cointegration, CUSUM (cumulative sum) and CUSUMSQ (CUSUM squared) tests, short run 
and long-term determinants and error correction in event of a shock. Policy implications are 
discussed in the light of the convergence needed for the feasibility of the proposed SAMU. 
This study extends the debate in scholarly and policy circles on the feasibility of proposed 
African monetary unions.   
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1. Introduction  
Three fundamental factors motivate the positioning of a study on the assessment of the 
stability of demand for money in the proposed Southern African Monetary Union (SAMU), 
notably: (i) the policy relevance of such a study in the light of the recent European Monetary 
Union (EMU) crisis; (ii) the evolving debate on the stability of demand for money and (iii) 
the need to bridge existing gaps in the literature. These three factors are expatiated in 
chronological order. 
 First, in relation to the policy front, the post-2008 monetary crises in the EMU have 
shown that a currency union that is not designed to be robust to a variety of macroeconomic 
shocks is not sustainable2. This is essentially because; in the event of serious disequilibria, 
adjustments to the long-run equilibrium are important in order to ensure consistency with the 
adopted convergence criteria (Asongu, 2013). Within the framework of demand for money, 
the effectiveness of the EMU central bank’s monetary policy is substantially contingent on a 
stable function of the demand for money in order to ensure that changes in monetary policy 
rate have expected outcomes on macroeconomic indicators such as national income and 
inflation (Fisher et al., 2007). This is because the criteria for the formation of currency areas 
suggests that the countries coming together to form a currency area should exhibit 
commonalities3. In this study, we looked at the effectiveness of monetary policy from the lens 
of price stability and by extension, shocks. Price stability can only be achieved when 
monetary policy is effective. In other words, the ineffectiveness of monetary policy will 
adversely affect the attainment of price stability.  
The underlying stability of demand for money function which is crucial for monetary 
policy effectiveness in the currency areas (Foresti & Napolitano, 2014) has been documented 
                                                          
2 The statement should not be construed as an indication of the EMU collapsing. This research is building on the experience 
of an existing monetary union (i.e. the EMU) to assess the feasibility of a Southern African Monetary Union within the 
framework of stability in money demand.    
3 The extent of trade, similarities of shocks and cycles, the degree of factor mobility and the system of fiscal transfer are the 
main criteria stipulated in Frankel and Rose (1998) as conditions for the establishment of a currency area. According to 
Frankel and Rose (1998), the suitability of a common currency area is strengthened when the linkage between the countries 
based on these criteria is high. Put in other words, the attendant literature on optimal currency areas shows that four main 
conditions are relevant for a successful common currency union. First, significant labor mobility should be apparent across 
borders of countries forming the currency union. Second, capital mobility should also be apparent as well as wage and price 
flexibility. Third, given that individual country monetary policy is subservient to the central bank of the monetary union, 
fiscal transfers are needed to automatically take place in order to assist nations that are adversely affected by the underlying 
factors of capital and labor mobility. Fourth, countries forming the common currency area must also share similar business 
cycles. The feasibility of potential common monetary policy is relevant for the effectiveness of some of the four components 
required for a successful common currency. Accordingly, as argued in this research, the stability of money demand in 
potential member states is imperative for the feasible common monetary policy.    
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to be fundamental in the recovery of the eurozone from negative externalities of the 2008 
global financial crisis (Barnett & Gaekwad, 2018). Effectiveness of monetary policy implies 
that it is possible to forecast the effect of monetary policy. When the demand for money is 
stable, the money multiplier is also stable, which in turn, implies that the effect of monetary 
policy could be forecasted4. The relevance of the EMU crisis to the potential effectiveness of 
a future African monetary union rests on the importance of an effective monetary policy that 
is contingent on a stable demand for money function.  
 Second, the relevance of monetary policy instruments in the demand for money 
function is still open to debate in the literature. One strand in the literature maintains that 
monetary policy effectiveness by means of mainstream instruments (such as the interest rate) 
is contingent on a stable demand for money (Poole, 1970). In accordance with a strand of 
recent literature (Foresti & Napolitano, 2014), the stability of the demand for money function 
is perceived as a basis for the utilization of aggregates of money in the exercise of monetary 
policy (Goldfeld & Sichel, 1990). Lucas (1976) maintains that when the demand for money 
function is unstable, it is impossible to tailor a constant conditional model for the demand for 
money.  According to Pradhan and Subramanian (2003), stability in the demand for money is 
an indication of the possibility of forecasting the impacts of monetary policy owing to 
evidence of a stable money multiplier. Hamori and Tokihisa (2001) posit that a stable 
function of the demand for money is fundamental in monetary policy that is not neutral.  
The second stance in the debate is based on the premise that less developed countries 
cannot be characterized by technically-feasible monetary policies because their 
comparatively less developed financial systems are not associated with conducive 
environments for monetary policy effectiveness. Weeks (2010) in this strand, cites sub-
Saharan Africa as an example by arguing that governments within the sub-region are 
fundamentally deficient in the relevant instruments needed to implement effective monetary 
policy. According to the author, such deficiencies are apparent in, inter alia: (i) the relevance 
of private credit through mechanisms such as open market operations and (ii) efforts devoted 
to affect private sector credit through variations in interest rates at which central banks lend to 
their commercial counterparts.  
                                                          
4 It is also relevant to note that the suggestion that a stable money demand automatically leads to a stable money multiplier 
may not be always the case. For instance, the money multiplier in the United States has gone through significant adjustments 
since the Federal Reserve began paying interest on excess reserves. The argument now is that the interest rate on excess 
reserves is the driving force of monetary policy and not the money stock. 
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 Third, in accordance with Folarin and Asongu (2019), contemporary studies related to 
the stability of the demand for money in developing countries have for the most part, been 
motivated by the importance of financial innovation in the instability of demand for money 
function. The extant studies that are supportive of this position include: Nachega et al. (2001) 
for Kenya, Kumar (2011) for twenty developing nations and Ndirangu and Nyamongo for 
Uganda. Considering the specific framework of this study on the SAMU, the extant 
knowledge on the proposed common currency area can be summarized in relation to 
positions for, positions against and positions for that are contingent on the convergence of 
certain criteria. The three contending positions are summarized in Section 2, notably: (i) 
positions for the embryonic monetary union (Debrun & Masson, 2013; Grandes, 2003); (ii) 
studies that have argued against the potential common currency area (Agdeyegbe, 2009) and 
(iii) research which has advanced positions on the feasibility of the monetary union 
contingent on some common efforts from candidate states (Zehirun et al., 2015; Masson, 
2008; Bangaké, 2008; Wang et al., 2007; Jefferis, 2007; Khamfula & Huizinga, 2004)5. It is 
apparent after comparing and contrasting contending positions that the dominant position in 
the literature is that the proposed currency area is feasible in the long-term if synchronization 
of and convergence in, some macroeconomic criteria is enhanced.   
 In spite of the substantially documented literature on the proposed SAMU on the one                       
hand and the stability of demand for money on the other hand, the extant literature has failed 
to investigate the stability of the demand for money within the framework of the SAMU. This 
study is therefore positioned as an extension of the underlying literature (engaged in the third 
strand) in view of contributing to the existing literature on the effectiveness of monetary 
policy (discussed in the second strand), in order to ultimately improve policy insights into the 
feasibility of the proposed SAMU (covered in the first strand). To this end, an autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing empirical approach to cointegration and an error 
correction modelling framework are employed to examine both short run and long-term 
nexuses between the demand for money and its determinants within a stability framework. 
The findings show divergence across countries in the stability of money.  This divergence is 
articulated in terms of differences in, cointegration, CUSUM (cumulative sum) and 
                                                          
5 The positioning of this research is also partially motivated by a growing strand of literature on the relevance of  sovereign 
debt, financial access and alternative mechanisms of financing in Africa’s development (Gevorkyan & Kvangraven, 
2016; Danquah et al., 2017;  Amponsah, 2017; Boamah, 2017;  Kusi et al., 2017; Bayraktar & Fofack, 2018; Tchamyou, 
2019a, 2019b; Boateng et al., 2018; Kusi & Opoku‐Mensah, 2018; Senga et al., 2018; Senga & Cassimon, 2018 ; Asongu et 
al., 2018, 2019; Dafe et al., 2018;  Gyeke-Dako et al., 2018;  Tchamyou et al., 2019; Bokpin et al., 2018; Asongu & 
Odhiambo, 2019). 
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CUSUMSQ (CUSUM squared) tests, short run and long-term determinants and error 
correction in event of a shock. 
 The positioning of the research departs from contemporary emerging market studies 
in Africa which have largely focused on inter alia: exchange rate volatility in West African 
countries (Emenike, 2018); studies on whether sovereign credit ratings  announcements 
influence excess equity and bond returns in Africa (Mutize & Gossel, 2018); linkages 
between industry structure, macroeconomic fundamentals and equity return in emerging 
market economies (Ndlovu & Alagidede, 2018); macroeconomic drivers of stock market 
development in South Africa (Ho, 2019) and factors that are hampering economic 
development in the Middle East and North Africa (Awdeh & Hamadi, 2019).  The rest of the 
study is presented as follows. A brief historical perspective and summary of the existing 
literature are covered in Section 2 while the data and methodology are discussed in Section 3. 
The empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 4 whereas Section 5 engages 
concluding implications and future research directions.  
 
2. Brief history and literature  
Before summarizing the extant literature motivating the positioning of this study, it is relevant 
to briefly discuss the historical context of the SAMU, which substantially builds from a 
broader scope of objectives of the African Union (AU).  The proposed SAMU is within a 
broader goal of an African Monetary Union (AMU) promoted by the AU. It is important to 
note that a core monetary objective of the AU is articulated in the African Economic 
Community (AEC) or Abuja treaty (Asongu et al., 2017). The treaty was signed on the 3rd of 
June 1991 and emphasized the need for an African Central Bank to be established by 2028, 
prior to the creation of an African Economic Community. Hence, the potential African 
Central Bank is projected to manage the proposed African currency within the framework of 
the AMU. The adoption of such a common currency in Africa is not a blanket process, but 
requires, inter alia, the integration of present and embryonic regional monetary unions, 
namely: the East African Monetary Union, the West African Monetary Union and the SAMU.  
 The foundations of the SAMU were set with a Trilateral Monetary Agreement of April 
1st 1986 within the framework of a Common Monetary Area (CMA) (Wang et al., 2007)6. 
The agreement and corresponding bilateral agreement binding South Africa with small 
                                                          
6 For more information on the integration process in Southern Africa region see Khamfula and Huizinga (2004), Jefferis 
(2007) and Tavlas (2009). 
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member states set the ground work for the harmonization of exchange and monetary policies. 
The purpose of the CMA was to boost economic development between countries, by inter 
alia: encouraging less developed countries within the monetary area on the one hand and on 
the other, enabling all parties to reap equitable benefits from the maintenance and 
development of the CMA.   
 
Table 1: Summary of empirical studies on the proposed Southern African Monetary Union 
Author(s) Periods Countries Methodologies Feasibility Justification/ 
recommendation 
      
Grandes (2003) 
 
1990-2001 Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia, Swaziland , 
South Africa 
Cointegration and 
cost/benefit analysis. 
Yes Common long-run trends.  
Khamfula & Huizinga 
(2004)  
1980-1996 SADC GARCH Model to 
assess disturbances in 
RER.  
Yes/No 
 
Yes for South Africa, 
Botswana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe. 
Khamfula & Mensteab 
(2004). 
1995-1999 SAMU (Southern 
African Monetary 
Union) 
Cost and Benefit 
analysis.  
Not definite  Structural adjustment 
policies are needed to 
enhance integration 
needed for the SAMU. 
Jefferis (2007) 1990-2002 SADC Macroeconomic and 
monetary convergence. 
Yes/No Selective expansion. 
Wang et al. (2007) 1980-2005 CMA Integration, 
convergence, shock and 
adjustment analyses. 
Yes/No Evidence of integration 
but more symmetric 
responses to shocks are 
needed. 
Bangaké (2008) 1990-2003 21 African countries  System of simultaneous 
equations and GMM. 
Yes/No Yes for Malawi, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe.  
Masson (2008) 1995-2000  SADC Calibration approach. Yes/No Selective expansion. 
Agdeyegbe (2009) 1992-2000 SADC  Estimating time-varying 
convergence 
parameters.  
No  Non convergence in 
exchange rate and 
inflation.  
Debrun & Masson 
(2013) 
1994-2010 SADC Calibration approach. Yes  Most members would 
benefit. 
Zehirun et al. (2015) 
 
1995-2012 11 SADC member 
countries  
Cointegration and 
VECM. 
Yes, without 
Angola and 
Mauritius.  
Generalised Purchasing 
Power Parity (GPPP) 
hypothesis holds.  
      
Notes. SADC: Southern African Development Community. CMA: Common Monetary Area. GARCH: Generalised 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity. RER: Real Exchange Rate. VECM: Vector Error Correction Model. GMM: 
Generalised Method of Moments. 
Source: Asongu et al. (2017) 
 
 Over the past decades, there have been significant changes within the CMA, notably: 
the integration of Namibia and the end of apartheid in South Africa. The corresponding 
targets, results and challenges are worth discussing.  First, in relation to the targets, the 
adoption of a single currency by member states of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) is the last phase in the boosting of regional economic integration. The 
timeline for this target was 20187, a date that was set by the Regional Indicative Strategic 
                                                          
7 It should be noted that the region was unable to form the SAMU by the expiration of the targeted year of 2018. However, 
countries such as Namibia, Swaziland and Lesotho have been using the Rand (i.e. the South African currency) as their 
second national currency following the Rand Monetary treaty in December 1974 (Wang et al., 2007).  
8 
 
Development Plan Implementation Framework. Second, some issues have also been raised 
and the SADC Payment Systems Steering Committee proposed a framework that could 
facilitate cross-border settlements and alleviate payment constraints. Third, the fundamental 
challenge to establishing the monetary union is the lack of clarity on the position of countries 
which are associated with two or more custom unions.  
The extant literature on the feasibility of the proposed SAMU has been summarised 
by Asongu et al. (2017) in terms positions for, positions against and positions that are 
contingent on the fulfilment of certain criteria, notably: a thesis for the currency area (or 
arguments in support for the establishment of the currency union), an anti-thesis (or 
corresponding arguments against) and a synthesis (or arguments for the currency union that 
are contingent on the realisation of some common macroeconomic criteria). The extant 
literature is summarised in Table 1.  
Studies with the position for the currency area are Grandes (2003) and Debrun and 
Masson (2013) while studies with a stance on synthesis are Khamfula & Huizinga, 2004; 
Jefferis, 2007; Wang et al., 2007; Bangaké, 2008; Masson, 2008; Zehirun et al., 2015. Studies 
under the synthesis stance argued for relevance of the currency areas, contingent on efforts 
from member states in view of enhancing the harmonization of convergence criteria. An 
opposite position is adopted by Agdeyegbe (2009) who recommends against the currency 
union.   
 In the light of the above, the predominant position from the extant literature is that a 
monetary union in Southern Africa is very likely if concerns about heterogeneities in 
fundamental variables are addressed, namely, in terms of fiscal, monetary and real policy 
convergence (Zehirun et al., 2015; Masson, 2008; Bangaké, 2008; Masson, 2008; Wang et al., 
2007; Jefferis, 2007; Khamfula & Huizinga, 2004). This implies that a selective process of 
monetary integration is the optimal route. This selective process includes, direct 
disqualification of member states and/or identification of clusters. For instance, Debrun and 
Masson (2013) maintain that with the exceptions of Mauritius, Tanzania and Angola, 
integrating the CMA by SADC countries will prove beneficial for all. Moreover, a SADC-
extended symmetry monetary union is beneficial to all member states without Mauritius. 
Furthermore, Jefferis (2007) posits that Swaziland, South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, 
Tanzania, Mauritius and Mozambique constitute the core convergence panel with the CMA 
whereas Zambia, Malawi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola constitute the non-
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converging panel. For brevity and lack of space, substantiated narratives of the literature as 
summarised in Table 1 are documented in Asongu et al. (2017)8. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
The study uses annual data for the period 1981 to 2015 from World Development Indicators 
(WDI) and the International Financial Statistics (IFS). The adopted frequency and periodicity 
of the data are contingent on data availability constraints at the time of the study. Moreover, 
such frequency has been used in recent literature on the stability of money demand in the 
proposed West African Monetary Union (Asongu et al., 2019). Thus, for each country, a total 
of 35 observations are used for the analysis9. Ten countries in SADC are involved in the 
analysis, namely: Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland and Zambia. The 
adopted variables include: real broad money, real gross domestic product (GDP), exchange 
rate, inflation and foreign interest rate. The adopted variables are in line with Folarin and 
Asongu (2019) and the literature on the stability of the demand for money discussed in the 
introduction. The definitions and sources of the variables are clarified in Table 2. 
(i) Foreign interest rate represents the United Kingdom (UK) three month treasury bills. (ii) 
The exchange rate denotes the official exchange rate in terms of local currency units, relative 
to the United States (US) Dollar. (iii) The inflation rate is measured as a percentage change in 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator. (iv) Real broad money is measured in terms of 
nominal broad money divided by the GDP deflator. Here, the demand for money comprises 
of saving and time deposits (at constant prices) at the commercial banks. (v) Real GDP is 
obtained when GDP is divided by the GDP deflator. Accordingly, this is the monetary value 
(at constant price) pertaining to commodities that are produced over a specific time period 
within an economy.  
While the first (i.e. foreign interest rate) variable is from the IFS, the second to the 
fifth variables are from WDI of the World Bank. Table 3 provides the summary statistics of 
the variables. From the table it is apparent that there is substantial variation in the variables 
                                                          
8 In addition, the bulk of contemporary financial development literature on the continent  has not focused on whether the 
proposed African monetary unions are feasible  (Wale & Makina, 2017;  Daniel, 2017; Chikalipah, 2017; Bocher et al., 
2017;  Osah & Kyobe, 2017; Boadi et al., 2017; Oben & Sakyi, 2017; Ofori-Sasu et al., 2017; Iyke & Odhiambo, 2017; 
Chapoto & Aboagye, 2017). 
9 In all the sampled countries, there were more of periods with positive growth in money demand than periods with negative 
growth. This suggests that in the selected countries, the monetary aggregate is associated with inflationary pressure.  
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such that we can be confident that reasonable estimated nexuses will be derived from the 
regressions.  
 
Table 2: Definitions and sources of variables  
     
Variables Full names Definitions Units Sources 
     
UKINTEREST10 Foreign interest 
rate 
UK three month 
treasury bill rate 
Percentage International 
Financial statistics 
(IFS) 
RM2 Real broad money  Nominal board 
money divided by 
GDP deflator 
Billion local 
currency 
World 
Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
     
RGDP Real GDP Gross domestic 
product divided by 
GDP deflator 
Billion local 
currency 
World 
Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
     
INFL Inflation rate GDP deflator 
(Annual %) 
Percentage World 
Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
     
EXCH Exchange rate Official exchange 
rate - local 
currency units 
relative to the U.S. 
dollar 
Local 
currency 
World 
Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Note: The data used for the study spans over the period 1981 to 2015.  RM2: Real broad money. Real GDP:  
Real Gross Domestic Product. INFL: Inflation rate. EXCH: Exchange rate. UKINTEREST; Foreign interest 
rate.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 UKINTEREST is used to proxy foreign interest rate. Foreign interest rate is the same as UK interest rate. Thus, it is used 
interchangeably in the paper. Foreign interest rate (i.e. the UK interest rate), is relevant in the study because an increase in 
foreign interest rate has the potential of inducing domestic residents to increase their holding of foreign assets, thus reducing 
corresponding holdings of domestic currency (Sriram, 2000). Our choice of the UK interest rate as a measure of foreign 
interest rate is because large shares of African countries’ foreign assets holdings are in the UK (Page & te Velde, 2004). 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Southern African Development Community 
  RM2 RGD INFL EXCH UKINTEREST 
 
Botswana 
Mean 0.17 0.44 9.21 4.26 6.36 
Maximum 0.40 0.88 22.89 10.13 14.64 
Minimum 0.03 0.11 -0.11 0.84 0.30 
Standard dev. 0.12 0.22 5.97 2.53 4.26 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
Mean 8.04 70.8 1144.67 278.045 6.36 
Maximum 57.3 108 26762.02 925.99 14.64 
Minimum 0.76 46.1 -0.39 0.00 0.30 
Standard dev. 9.53 16.9 4545.315 365.10 4.26 
 
Lesotho 
Mean 0.05 0.13 9.34 5.38 6.36 
Maximum 0.08 0.24 20.08 12.76 14.64 
Minimum 0.02 0.06 -4.85 0.88 0.30 
Standard dev. 0.02 0.05 5.49 3.17 4.26 
 
Madagascar 
Mean 0.99 4.61 14.12 11119.05 6.36 
Maximum 1.75 6.83 45.12 2933.51 14.64 
Minimum 0.46 3.30 2.76 54.35 0.30 
Standard dev. 0.37 1.13 9.51 848.01 4.26 
 
Malawi 
Mean 1.33 6.74 22.94 88.36 6.36 
Maximum 3.13 12.8 112.69 496.37 14.64 
Minimum 0.67 3.58 4.10 0.90 0.30 
Standard dev. 0.75 2.72 20.90 124.52 4.26 
 
Mauritius 
Mean 1.44 1.68 6.38 22.36 6.36 
Maximum 3.42 3.20 12.92 35.06 14.64 
Minimum 0.25 0.62 -0.65 8.94 0.30 
Standard dev. 0.94 0.79 3.31 7.83 4.26 
 
Seychelles 
Mean 0.03 0.05 5.65 7.23 6.36 
Maximum 0.05 0.08 34.97 13.70 14.64 
Minimum 0.01 0.02 -4.21 4.76 0.30 
Standard dev. 0.02 0.02 8.20 2.99 4.26 
 
South Africa 
Mean 12.7 20.5 10.14 5.38 6.36 
Maximum 22.5 30.6 17.22 12.76 14.64 
Minimum 7.28 14.5 4.99 0.88 0.30 
Standard dev. 5.65 5.41 4.06 3.17 4.26 
 
Swaziland 
Mean 0.05 0.23 9.49 5.38 6.36 
Maximum 0.10 0.41 30.38 12.76 14.64 
Minimum 0.02 0.09 1.11 0.88 0.30 
Standard dev. 0.02 0.10 6.63 3.17 4.26 
Zambia Mean 5.40 0.59 36.68 2.44 6.36 
Maximum 95.7 1.25 165.53 8.63 14.64 
Minimum 0.05 0.37 5.44 0.00 0.30 
Standard dev. 21.8 0.28 40.23 2.39 4.26 
Notes: RM2 is real board money; RGDP is real gross domestic product; INFL is inflation rate based on GDP 
deflator; EXCH is exchange rate; UKINTEREST is the foreign interest rate. Standard dev: Standard deviation.  
 
 
 
12 
 
3.2 Methodology 
Consistent with recent literature on the relevance of assessing the stability of the demand 
function with cointegration techniques (Bahmani-Oskooee & Rehman, 2005; Bahmani-
Oskooee & Gelan, 2009; Asongu et al., 2019), an ARDL approach is adopted in this study 
because it is consistent with unit root properties of the data. One of the main advantages of 
the ARDL model is that it addresses concerns pertaining to collinearity between the lags of 
the outcome indicators, variables in the conditioning information set and their corresponding 
lags. Also, the ARDL is appropriate when the variables used are comprised of series’ that are 
integrated of order zero, I(0) and of order one, I(1) (Asongu et al., 2019; Folarin, 2019).  
As documented in Folarin and Asongu (2019), the theoretical settings for an investigation on 
the stability of the demand for money is in accordance with Hossain (1993, p. 91). Within the 
context of this paper, while real income is used as a scale variable, opportunity variables 
include: the inflation and interest rates. Consistent with Bahmani-Oskooee and Gelan (2009), 
using interest rate to proxy for an opportunity variable within the framework of a developing 
nation is not appropriate because of the comparative underdevelopment of financial sectors in 
less developed countries. This is partly because a great chunk of the monetary base in 
developing countries circulates outside the formal financial sector (Tchamyou, 2019a, 
2019b). It has further been argued by Bahmani-Oskooee and Gelan (2009) that owing to the 
relatively less formal nature of financial systems in countries with less developed financial 
systems (e.g. most African countries), the complex market situation cannot be captured by the 
interest rate. This shortcoming can be tackled by employing the inflation rate as an alternative 
opportunity variable. Studies in the attendant literature have either employed both (i.e. 
interest rate and inflation rate) variables (e.g. Kumar et al., 2013) or exclusively interest rate 
(Anoruo, 2002; Akinlo, 2006) or exclusively inflation rate (Bahmani-Oskooee and Gelan, 
2009; Asongu et al. 2019) 
 The extant literature has also articulated the relevance of acknowledging currency 
substitution and foreign exchange rates in the assessment of the money demand function 
(Folarin & Asongu, 2019). For instance, Chaisrisawatsuk et al. (2004) have emphasized that 
the use of foreign bonds as an alternative channel of investment by the citizens of a country 
has an incidence on the potential return on investment connected to the domestic demand for 
money. Also, Sriram (2000) has pointed out that foreign assets are also substitutes for holding 
money; hence, an increase in the return on foreign assets reduces the incentive for the 
residents of a country to hold money. Note should be taken of the fact that currency 
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substitution is associated with the incidence of exchange rate on money demand while the 
essence of foreign interest rates on money demand is articulated by the impact of capital 
mobility.   
 In the light of the discussed empirical framework, the examination of the demand for 
money can be expressed as follows:  
,                   (1) 
where m is real monetary aggregate, y is income variable, op are opportunity variables,  is 
foreign interest rate and E is real effective exchange rate.  
Equation (1) can be re-expressed in a double log form as follows: 
               (2) 
where, ln is natural logarithm, m is real demand for money, y is real income,   is domestic 
interest rate, INF is inflation rate,  is foreign interest rate11, E is exchange rate, s are the 
coefficients for the variables considered in the study,  is the residual term and t is time. 
Considering that the variables defined in Equations (2) are characterized by time series, it is 
important to test their corresponding stationary properties in order to avoid concerns about 
spurious regressions. Such stationary properties are tested with the Phillips-Perron (PP) test 
which has been established to be comparatively more reliable and efficient (relative to the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller test) when the time series is of longer periodicity (Gries et al., 
2009).  The notion of longer periodicity should be understood within the framework of 
annual versus monthly and/or quarterly data.  
 
Table 4: Philips-Perron Unit root test results 
 Botswana The DRC Lesotho Madagascar Malawi 
LRM2 -1.070 -1.801 -1.838 -5.492*** -1.31 
∆LRM2 -7.278*** -7.998*** -5.556*** -6.836*** -5.478*** 
LRGDP -2.650 0.068 -1.675 -2.608 -1.850 
∆LRGDP -4.035*** -1.627* -5.333*** -7.089*** -7.604*** 
INFL -8.620*** -5.422*** -5.364*** -3.004 -4.704*** 
∆INFL -10.732*** -19.290*** -14.510*** -10.161*** -16.589*** 
LEXCH -2.795 -0.619 -2.427 -1.760 -1.671 
∆LEXH -5.129*** -2.213** -4.208*** -5.243*** -3.868*** 
UKINTEREST -2.495 -2.495 -2.495 -2.495 -2.495 
∆UKINTEREST -6.320*** -6.320*** -6.320*** -6.320*** -6.320*** 
                                                          
11
 Foreign interest rate is in nominal form. 
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 Mauritius Seychelles South Africa Swaziland Zambia 
LRM2 -1.322 -0.992 -1.892 -1.959 -3.091 
∆LRM2 -4.406*** -4.344*** -3.638** -6.447*** -11.735*** 
LRGDP -0.794 -2.003 -2.136 -1.334 -1.305 
∆LRGDP -5.092*** -4.644*** -3.932*** -3.70*** -3.985*** 
INFL -3.997** -4.272*** -4.296*** -8.323*** -2.361 
∆INFL -17.868*** -11.098*** -8.801*** -33.307*** -4.936*** 
LEXCH -2.690 -1.014 -2.427 -2.428 -0.586 
∆LEXH -6.376*** -3.860*** -4.208*** -4.207*** -2.755* 
UKINTEREST -2.495 -2.495 -2.495 -2.495 -2.495 
∆UKINTEREST -6.320*** -6.320*** -6.320*** -6.320*** -6.320*** 
Notes: *, **, *** are significance levels of  10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. RM2 is real board money; RGDP is 
real gross domestic product; INFL is inflation rate based on GDP deflator; EXCH is exchange rate; 
UKINTEREST is foreign interest rate. The reported values are the corresponding t-statistics. The DRC: The 
Democratic Republic of Congo.  
 
As apparent in Table 4, the variables are stationary both in levels and first difference. 
Given the nature of the stationary property of the variables used in this study, it follows that 
an ARDL approach is appropriate for the estimation. In this situation, a bounds testing 
framework developed by Pesaran et al. (2001) is employed to assess if variables have a long-
term nexus or are cointegrated. Contrary to existing empirical strategies (such as Johansen 
and Engle & Granger tests), a favorable characteristic of the adopted strategy is that it is 
suitable when the variables used are of various orders of integration, that is, it allows 
variables of order zero and one to be combined when testing for the presence of long-run 
relationships. The corresponding ARDL model is specified in Equation (3) as follows: 
 
      (3) 
The extended ARDL framework expressed in Equation (3) is then estimated by means 
of bounds testing12. The results of the cointegration test are presented in Table 5. From the 
                                                          
12 Optimal lag selection for each variable is based on the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). Through the Wald 
restriction, the F-statistics is then estimated, notably: by assigning restrictions to the lagged value of all level series’ 
corresponding to the two equations (see Pesaran et al., 2001). The related F-statistics is then employed to examine the long 
run effect among adopted variables. It is relevant to note that the null hypothesis corresponding to the Wald restriction which 
is imposed on Equation (3) is the following .  The value of the F-statistics is 
obtained by comparing the critical values of the lower limit vis-à-vis those of the upper limit. The critical values are from 
Pesaran et al. (2001). To the best of our knowledge, within the framework of cointegration, in a situation where the estimated 
F-statistics exceeds the critical value corresponding to the upper limit, then the null hypothesis for the position of “no 
cointegration” is rejected and evidence of a long run relationship or cointegration is established. Conversely, in a scenario 
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results, it is evident that cointegration holds in six out of the ten selected SADC countries13, 
namely: Botswana, the DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Seychelles and Zambia. Hence, for the 
remaining countries that do not reflect cointegration because the F-statistics is below the 
lower bound critical value, only short run analysis will be performed. These include: Lesotho, 
Mauritius, South Africa and Swaziland. 
 
Table 5: Results of the ARDL co-integration test 
Countries ARDL structure F-statistics Remarks 
Botswana 2,1,0,2,0 4.349** Co-integrated 
The DRC 1,1,0,0,3 12.908*** Co-integrated 
Lesotho 1,0,0,1,0 2.416 Not co-integrated 
Madagascar 1,0,0,2,3 6.370*** Co-integrated 
Malawi 1,0,0,1,0 6.029*** Co-integrated 
Mauritius 1,0,0,1,0 2.943 Not co-integrated 
Seychelles 1,0,3,0,0 13.976*** Co-integrated 
South Africa 1,2,0,0,1 1.711 Not co-integrated 
Swaziland 2,3,0,1,0 1.424 Not co-integrated 
Zambia 2,0,0,0,0 3.508** Co-integrated 
 
Notes: *, **, *** are significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. ARDL: Autoregressive Distributed 
Lag.  Critical values are the following: (i) 2.45 for the I(0) Bound and  3.52 for the I(1) Bound at the 10% 
significance level; (ii) 2.86 for the I(0) Bound and 4.01 for the I(1) Bound for the 5% significance level; (iii) 
3.25 for the I(0) Bound and 4.49 for the I(1) Bound for the 2.5% significance level and (iv) 3.76 for the I(0) 
Bound and 5.06 for the I(1) Bound for the 1% significance level. The DRC: The Democratic Republic of Congo.  
 
 With evidence of co-integration, we proceed to assess the long run and short run 
impacts using an Error Correction Model (ECM) framework. Within this empirical 
framework, in a scenario of short-term shock, there is a speed of adjustment back to the 
cointegration or long term nexus. Moreover, the ECM also enables the study to investigate 
the effects of adopted control variables on the short run and long run demand for money.  
The ECM entails two steps. The first step focuses on the derivation of the Error 
Correction Term (ECT). For this purpose, the outcome variable is regressed on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
where the F-statistics is situated below the lower critical value, the corresponding hypothesis of cointegration is rejected. 
Unfortunately, evidence of the absence or presence cointegration cannot be established with certainty if the F-statistics falls 
between the critical values in the lower limit and upper limit. 
13 For these countries, the F-statistics exceeded the upper critical value for five countries and higher than the lower critical 
value for the sixth country, which is Zambia. For the case of Zambia, because the F-statistics falls between the lower and the 
upper critical bound, it falls under the unsure zone, which could either imply that a long run relationship holds or that it does 
not hold. A long run relationship holds in this situation if the coefficient of the ECT is negative and significant. This is 
exactly what we obtained in this study. Hence, it is appropriate to say that long run relationships hold in the six highlighted 
countries. 
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corresponding independent variables. Then the actual value of the outcome variable is 
deducted from the estimated value. This is illustrated as follows.  
          (4) 
In order to obtain the main model, the derived ECT from Equation (4) is then fitted in 
Equation (2) in order to obtain Equation (5) that is estimated within an ECM framework. The 
ECT is anticipated to reflect a negative sign. Such a negative sign implies that in case of an 
exogenous shock, the equilibrium nexus can be potentially restored. It is relevant to also 
emphasis that, one period after an exogenous shock the negative speed of adjustment should 
fall within the range of 0 and 1, with 1 implying a full adjustment and 0 denoting the absence 
of an adjustment. Conversely, a positive value of the adjustment coefficient implies the lack 
of evidence of convergence towards the long term cointegration after the underlying 
exogenous shock. In a nutshell, this reflects a permanent deviation from the long term 
equilibrium.  
 
 (5) 
Consistent with attendant studies in the empirical literature, the cumulative sum (CUSUM) 
and CUSUM squared (CUSUMSQ) tests of Brown et al. (1975) are employed to investigate 
the consistency of parameters (Kumar, 2011; Akinlo, 2006; Kumar et al., 2013; Khan & Hye, 
2013). Whereas the CUSUM test is related to the cumulative recursive sum of recursive 
residuals, CUSUMSQ test reflects the cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals. The 
stance on instability of the money function is rejected when the plots corresponding to the 
CUSUMSQ and CUSUM are significant at the 5% level. Hence, when the plots fall outside 
the critical lines (denoting the 5% significance levels), there is evidence of an unstable money 
demand function. Moreover, some diagnostic tests are conducted on the findings obtained 
from the ECM. These tests which are further employed to assess the goodness of fit of 
estimated models include:  the Jarque-Bera test for normality test, the Breusch-Godfrey (BG) 
test for serial correlation test and Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) test 
for heteroscedasticity.  
 
4. Empirical results  
Tables 6-7 show short-term and long run relationships between the broad money aggregate 
and its determinants for the ten sampled countries. While Table 6 focuses on Botswana, the 
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DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar and Malawi, Table 7 is concerned with Mauritius, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Swaziland and Zambia.  The last column of Table 7 provides panel-based 
evidence for the ten countries.  
 The following are apparent from the results.  In the short run, an increase in income 
has a significant contemporary positive effect on the demand for money in Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles and South Africa. Furthermore, the results show that in the 
short run, a change in inflation rate has a significant negative effect on money demand in 
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Seychelles and Swaziland. In addition, the results suggest that in 
Botswana, the DRC and Malawi, a change in exchange rate has a significant and positive 
effect on money demand. Foreign interest rate (UKINTEREST) is found to exert a positive 
and significant effect on money demand in the short run in Botswana while a negative and 
significant effect is observed for Seychelles. In the remaining eight SADC member states, the 
effect is insignificant.  
In all the six countries in the SADC where we were able to establish the existence of a 
long run relationship between money demand and its determinants, we discover that the 
values of the associated ECTs vary significantly. Moreover, for the cases considered, the 
coefficients of the ECT are negative and within the expected range of 0 and -1.  Going by the 
value of the coefficient of the ECT, it can be deduced that if shocks occur to countries within 
the SADC, the DRC will restore its long run equilibrium fastest, followed by Zambia while 
Seychelles will be the last country to restore its long-run equilibrium. In decreasing order to 
quick speed in restoring the long run equilibrium, we have the DRC, Zambia, Malawi, 
Botswana and Seychelles.  
By examining the long-run results, it is observed that in the DRC, Madagascar, 
Malawi and Seychelles, income has a significant and positive effect on money demand while 
an insignificant effect is apparent in Botswana and Zambia. More specifically, the results 
suggest that an increase in income leads to a more than proportional increase in the demand 
for money in the long run. In addition, in Botswana, Malawi and Seychelles, an increase in 
the inflation rate has a significant and negative effect on money demand while the effect is 
found to be insignificant in the DRC, Madagascar and Zambia. This suggests that as the 
opportunity cost of holding money increases (price level), less money is demanded in 
Botswana, Malawi and Seychelles. By implication, domestic residents of Botswana, Malawi 
and Seychelles will hold less of money and hold more of financial assets during inflationary 
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pressure. Since inflationary pressure makes the purchasing power of money to fall, this 
further implies that during inflationary pressure, money loses its role as a store of value.  
On the effect of exchange rate, an increase in exchange rate has a significant and 
positive effect on money demand in Botswana, the DRC and Madagascar while a significant 
and negative effect is found in Malawi and Seychelles. The findings suggest that currency 
substitution is associated with exchange rate depreciation in Malawi and Seychelles. In 
addition, we discovered that foreign interest rate has a significant and negative effect on 
money demand in Seychelles while a positive and significant effect is apparent in the DRC. 
In the remaining four countries were cointegration holds, foreign interest rate has an 
insignificant effect on money demand.  
We now turn to the last column of Table 7, which is the panel evidence. In this 
column, we find that in the long run, income has a positive and significant effect on money 
demand while inflation has a negative and significant effect. The effects of exchange rate and 
foreign interest rate are insignificant. The implication of these findings is that within the 
SADC, demand for money is associated with an increase in income and inversely related to 
the inflation rate. Only inflation has a significant effect among the opportunity variables 
considered in the study.  
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Table 6: ARDL Estimation 
      
 Botswana DRC Lesotho Madagascar Malawi 
      
Long run estimation      
constant 62.814* 
(33.304) 
-91.811*** 
(14.699) 
 -2.756 
(4.155) 
-35.775*** 
(10.186) 
LRGDP -2.438 
(1.776) 
4.533*** 
(0.575) 
 1.016*** 
(0.188) 
2.573*** 
(0.455) 
INFL -0.066* 
(0.038) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
LEXCH 3.492** 
(1.620) 
0.081** 
(0.031) 
 0.126** 
(0.045) 
-0.337*** 
(0.080) 
UKINTEREST 0.089 
(0.066) 
0.196** 
(0.089) 
 0.007 
(0.014) 
-0.031 
(0.029) 
  
 
   
  
 
   
Short run estimation      
      ∆LRM2(-1) -0.326** 
(0.138) 
    
∆LRGDP 0.473 
(0.509) 
1.088 
(1.526) 
0.532 
(0.729) 
0.687*** 
(0.199) 
0.959*** 
(0.322) 
∆LRGDP(-1)      
∆LRGDP(-2)      
∆INFL -0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
∆LEXCH 0.680*** 
(0.229) 
0.069** 
(0.025) 
0.151 
(0.108) 
-0.011 
(0.117) 
0.221** 
(0.104) 
∆LEXCH(-1) -0.594** 
(0.222) 
    
∆UKINTEREST 0.021* 
(0.011) 
-0.066 
(0.046) 
-0.005 
(0.009) 
0.000 
(0.008) 
-0.011 
(0.011) 
∆UKINTEREST(-1)  0.086 
(0.057) 
 -0.002 
(0.012) 
 
∆UKINTEREST(-2)  -0.156*** 
(0.049) 
 -0.018* 
(0.009) 
 
ECT(-1) -0.233** 
(0.107) 
-0.862*** 
(0.132) 
 -0.676*** 
(0.159) 
-0.373*** 
(0.107) 
R-squared 0.981 0.864 0.069 0.978 0.955 
Normality test 0.622 0.432 0.649 0.848 0.597 
ARCH test (1)0.903 
(3)0.931 
(1)0.580 
(3)0.784 
(1)0.838 
(3)0.641 
(1)0.470 
(3)0.790 
(1)0.558 
(3)0.895 
BG LM test (1) 0.0
20 
(3)0.034 
(1)0.077 
(3)0.214 
(1)0.153 
(3)0.250 
(1)0.702 
(3)0.399 
(1)0.476 
(3)0.607 
CUSUM Stable Stable Stable  Not stable  Stable 
CUSUMSQ Stable  Stable  Stable  Stable Stable 
Notes: *,**, *** denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The reported values in parenthesis are the standard 
errors. The reported value for Normality test, ARCH test and BG LM test are the probability value of the F-statistics. BG is 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial correlation LM test. DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo.  
 
20 
 
Table 7: ARDL Estimation (Continuation) 
       
 Mauritius Seychelles South 
Africa 
Swaziland Zambia All 
       
Long run 
estimation 
      
       
constant  -6.484 
(6.018) 
  23.820 
(31.652) 
1.706*** 
(0.594) 
LRGDP  1.467*** 
(0.337) 
  -0.227 
(1.532) 
0.473** 
(0.216) 
INFL  -0.065** 
(0.031) 
  -0.007 
(0.010) 
-0.038*** 
(0.010) 
LEXCH  -0.656** 
(0.262) 
  0.132 
(0.223) 
0.088 
(0.064) 
UKINTEREST  -0.059** 
(0.028) 
  0.014 
(0.210) 
-0.007 
(0.022) 
  
 
    
  
 
    
Short run 
estimation 
      
       
∆LRM2(-1)     0.393** 
(0.178) 
0.004 
(0.102) 
∆LRM2(-2)       
∆LRGDP 1.007** 
(0.412) 
0.274** 
(0.122) 
2.074*** 
(0.373) 
-0.038 
(0.425) 
-0.176 
(1.185) 
0.283 
(0.416) 
∆LRGDP(-1)      0.136 
(0.0347) 
∆INFL -0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
∆INFL(-1)  -0.002 
(0.001) 
   0.001 
(0.001) 
∆INFL(-2)  0.006*** 
(0.001) 
    
∆LEXCH -0.093 
(0.103) 
-0.122 
(0.077) 
0.019 
(0.058) 
0.059 
(0.116) 
0.102 
(0.173) 
0.090 
(0.091) 
∆LEXCH(-1)      0.083 
(0.161) 
∆UKINTEREST 0.000 
(0.005) 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
0.011 
(0.163) 
-0.015 
(0.019) 
∆UKINTEREST(-1)      0.004 
(0.006) 
∆UKINTEREST(-2)       
ECT(-1)  -0.187*** 
(0.057) 
  -0.773*** 
(0.187) 
-0.166*** 
(0.058) 
R-squared 0.142 0.994 0.548 0.321 0.233  
Normality test 0.721 0.380 0.623 0.521 0.000  
ARCH test (1)0.294 
(3)0.164 
(1)0.763 
(3)0.939 
(1)0.549 
(3)0.821 
(1)0.776 
(3)0.810 
(1)0.668 
(3)0.908 
 
BG LM test (1)0.595 
(3)0.466 
(1)0.281 
(3)0.487 
(1)0.735 
(3)0.943 
(1)0.061 
(3)0.170 
(1)0.500 
(3)0.364 
 
CUSUM Not stable  Stable Stable Stable Stable  
CUSUMSQ Stable Not stable Stable Stable Not Stable  
Notes: *,**, *** denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The reported values in parenthesis are the standard 
errors. The reported value for Normality test, ARCH test and BG LM test are the probability value of the F-statistics. BG is 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial correlation LM test. 
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We now turn to the assessment of the stability of the relationship between money 
demand and its determinants. As discussed in the methodological section, we employ the 
CUSUM and CUSUM-squared tests. The CUSUM test is based on the cumulative sum of the 
recursive residuals whereas the CUSUM-squared test is based on the cumulative sum of the 
squared recursive residuals. The results of the stability of money demand function reveal 
divergence for the countries in the SADC14. Specifically, the results show that the demand for 
money is stable in six out of the ten selected SADC countries based on both CUSUM and 
CUSUMSQ tests, namely: Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa and 
Swaziland. The remaining four countries exhibit partial stability. This is because one of the 
two stability tests reveals that the demand for money is stable. More specifically, the results 
point out that the demand for money is stable based on CUSUM test in Seychelles and 
Zambia but turn to be unstable judging by CUSUMSQ test while in the case of Madagascar 
and Mauritius, the results reveal that the demand for money is unstable judging by CUSUM 
test but stable in the light of the CUSUMSQ test. Our results point out that despite the 
introduction of financial innovations over the last decades and the liberalization of the 
financial sector in SADC countries, the demand for money is still stable in six out of the ten 
countries examined. The partial stability observed in the remaining 4 countries suggests that 
when designing common monetary policy, the attending implication of financial innovation 
should be considered.  
Overall, in Tables 6-7, the diagnostic tests of residuals overwhelmingly confirm the 
presence of normally distributed errors (i.e. failure to reject the null hypothesis of Jarque-
Bera test) and absence of serial correlation (i.e. failure to reject the null hypothesis of the 
Breusch-Godfrey). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 A country is said to experience stability of money demand in this paper if the conclusion emanating from both CUSUM 
and CUSUM-squared tests implies stability. Partial stability is when it is only stable based on either the CUSUM test or the 
CUSUM-squared test.  
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Stability test charts 
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Madagascar 
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South Africa 
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5. Concluding implications and future research directions 
An important outcome of the quantity theory of money is that variations in economic 
activity (i.e. changes in prices and output) which influence variations in the quantity of 
money are feasible when the velocity of money is stable. A relevant lesson from the recent 
European Monetary Union (EMU) crisis to the proposed African monetary unions is the 
importance of stable macroeconomic policies. The formation of the Southern African 
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Monetary Union (SAMU) implies that each country will abandon its idiosyncratic monetary 
policy objectives in favour of the union’s objectives and by extension, common monetary 
policy measures. Application of the same monetary policy implies that all the countries 
exhibit a similar monetary pattern and one of such crucial patterns is the stable nature of 
money demand. The use of monetary aggregates as monetary policy instruments can only be 
effective when money demand is stable. Hence, instability of money demand in some 
countries can undermine the effectiveness of monetary policy in the proposed union. 
This study investigates the stability of money in the proposed SAMU. It uses annual 
data for the period 1981 to 2015 from ten countries making-up the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). A standard money demand function is designed and 
estimated using a bounds testing approach to co-integration and error-correction modeling. 
The findings show divergence across countries in the stability of money.  This divergence is 
articulated in terms of differences in cointegration, CUSUM (cumulative sum) and 
CUSUMSQ (CUSUM squared) tests, short run and long term determinants and error 
correction in event of a shock. Cointegration is apparent in six of the ten SADC countries, 
namely: Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Madagascar, Malawi, 
Seychelles and Zambia. In event of a shock, the DRC will restore its long-run equilibrium 
first followed by Zambia, Malawi, Botswana and Seychelles. The demand for money is stable 
in six of the ten SADC countries based on both CUSUM and CUSUM SQ tests, namely: 
Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa and Swaziland.  The remaining four 
countries exhibit partial stability, namely: Seychelles and Zambia (from the CUSUM test) 
and Madagascar and Mauritius (from the CUSUMSQ test). In what follows, we discuss 
policy implications in the light of convergence needed for the feasibility of the proposed 
SAMU.  
 Given the variations in the fundamentals of demand for money, the established 
divergence could be the outcome of asymmetry in the targeted objectives and benchmarks 
related to convergence in monetary policy in the member states. Based on this observed 
divergence, to achieve convergence, country-specific and idiosyncratic policies are important. 
For instance, South Africa, which is a major driver in Southern Africa, does not have a 
cointegrated money demand. This implies that South Africa could substantially undermine 
the effectiveness of monetary policy in the union. This is essentially because the established 
determinants of the demand for money vary from one country to another. Moreover, even 
when some cross-country determinants appear to affect the demand for money in the same 
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order of significance and sign, the contemporaneous nature of the effect differs. Hence, 
harmonizing the timing of how determinants of demand for money affect the demand for 
money is also essential for the convergence process. The potential harmonization is important 
because the countries are aiming to create a common currency area. Hence, this 
recommendation of harmonizing policies is based on the prospect of a common currency 
area. 
The engineering of effective monetary policy within a monetary union is contingent 
on the stability of the money demand function. Accordingly, a stable money demand function 
is an indication that a more stable money multiplier is feasible and by extension, better 
forecasts of the impacts of monetary policy for the proposed SAMU as well for financial 
markets in the sub-region. It also worthwhile to note that countries that have a history of 
economic turbulence are more likely to reflect a less stable money demand function and a 
higher inflation influence,  compared to their counterparts with stable economies.  
The heterogeneity of the results in the paper suggests that the various countries 
forming the potential SAMU have slightly different demand for money features. In the event 
that the union is established, the ineffectiveness of monetary policy will be traceable to cross-
country differences in monetary policy fundamentals. Hence, monetary policy under the 
proposed union should be designed in such a way that it is flexible to incorporate the 
characteristics of different countries. For instance, from our results, we have not established a 
long run relationship in South Africa which is a key player in the proposed monetary union. 
The importance of South Africa in the proposed union is informed by the relative size of the 
country’s economy. This further reinforces our view on the need to incorporate country 
differences when designing monetary policy for the proposed union in order to avert the issue 
of monetary policy ineffectiveness. South Africa currently practices inflation targeting. This 
policy initiative is informed by the unstable nature of the country’s demand for money 
function. Further research can focus on clarifying factors contributing to the established 
divergences by assessing inherent macroeconomic differences between sampled countries. 
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